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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
BANKRUPTCY.
A corporation of New York presented a petition, under the
New York Code, for its dissolution and the appointment of a
Act of receiver of its property, upon the ground of in-
Bankruptcy, solvency; which petition was granted. A creditor
Receiver of the corporation claimed that this petition
amounted to a " general assignment for the benefit of creditors,"
and was therefore an act of bankruptcy within § 3, a, 4, of the
Bankruptcy Act, but the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, decided that the proceeding could not possibly be
construed to come within the term, "assignment." In Re
Empire Co., 98 Fed. 981.
BANKS AND BANKING.
Few questions have occasioned more contradictory theories
and decisions by courts than that of a deposit in a savings
Deposit bank in the name of another. In Sullivan v.
in N.e of Sullivan, 56 N. E. i 16, the depositor received the
Another following certificate: "A. has deposited in this
bank $2,000 payable to the order of herself, or, in case of her
death, to B." After A.'s death B. claimed the money. The
Court of Appeals of New York, following its own decisions
alone, decided that B. had no right to the fund, as against
A.'s administrator, no matter whether B.'s claim were based
on contract, gift or trust.
BILLS AND NOTES.
In Pennsylvania the rule, as laid down by Ross v. Espy, 66
Pa. 482, would seem to be that the blank indorsement of a
Indorsentent, negotiable instrument is not such a contract in
Parol writing as cannot be altered and varied by
Evidence parol evidence. In Bank v. Hoopes, 98 Fed. 935,
Judge Dallas, of the Circuit Court (E. D. Penna.), strongly
criticises this decision and the reasoning upon which it is
based, and he approves of the opposite rule, adopted by the
Federal Courts, as being in accord with principle.
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CARRIERS.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has lately been called upon to
decide an interesting question on the liability of an express
Absolute company for the delivery of goods to the wrong
Duty to person. In Oskamp v. South. Exp. Co., 56 N. E.
Identify 13, A., fraudulently assuming the name of B., a
Consignee reputable merchant in his town, ordered goods
from C. in another town, by mail, under the name of B., and
C. consigned the goods to the express company, directed to
B. On the arrival of the goods A., by representing to the
agent of the express company that he was B., obtained the
goods. In an action by C. against the express company for
the false delivery, it was strongly urged on behalf of the de-
fendant that C. had no reason to complain, since the goods
were delivered to the actual person to whom C. had consigned
them, even though he was mistaken as to the name of that
person. The court, however, reversed a judgment for the de-
fendant on the ground that the defendant was under the abso-
lute duty of delivering the goods to B., and to no other person.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The Court of Appeals of New York has affirmed the de-
cision of the Supreme Court of that state in People v. School
Separate Board, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 330, to the effect that the
Schools for Constitution of New York (Art. 9, § I), providing
Colored for a system of free public schools wherein all the
Children children of the state may be educated, is not vio-
lated by an act establishing separate schools for white and
colored children, since the object of the constitutional pro-
vision is only to secure equal facilities for each class: People
v. School Board, 56 N. E. 81.
CONTRACTS.
In Scott v. Pub. Co., 62 N. Y. Suppl. 6o9, the Supreme
Court of New York gave a reasonable construction of a con-
Contract with tract with an advertising solicitor. The contract
Advertilng provided that he should receive a percentage on
Agent all contracts and also "on all business that fol-
lowed the original contracts." The solicitor, having been dis-
charged, brought an action for his commissions on contracts
received, after his discharge, from customers whom he had
originally secured. Held, that the last clause of the contract
must be construed as referring only to contracts secured dur-
ing plaintiff's employment, since it evidently showed that the
plaintiff was under the duty of keeping the advertisers secured
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CONTRACTS (Continued).
by him in touch with the paper; therefore the plaintiff had no
interest in the continuation of the advertisements after his
discharge.
CORPORATIONS.
The nature of the relation between a corporation and its
stockholders has always raised perplexing questions. One of
Dividends, the latter is presented where a dividend is declared,
Declaration, but before it is paid, the corporation becomes in-
Trust Fund solvent. In such a case are the stockholders
cestuis que trustent as to the amount of the dividend, so as to
be preferred to the corporation creditors? The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire has decided in favor of the view
that the dividend must not only be declared, but it must
be actually set apart for payment, before the trust relation is
raised; otherwise the stockholder occupies the position of a
mere creditor in respect to the dividend: Hunt v. O'Shea, 45
Atl. 48o.
COURTS.
A statute of Montana (Comp. Laws, 128, § 460) provides
that where the trustees of any corporation fail to advertise or
Julslon, file of record reports of the financial condition of
penal the corporation, they shall be jointly and severally
Action liable for the debts of the corporation. In an
action against one of the trustees to enforce this liability, it
was objected that the action was penal in its nature and could
not be brought outside of Montana. The Circuit Court (D.
Conn.) decided that under the decision in Huntingdon v. Attrill,
146 U. S. 676, the action was not penal, but merely remedial,
therefore the Circuit Court had jurisdiction: Davis v. Mills,
99 Fed. 39.
DEEDS.
Clark v. Clark, 56 N. E. 82, is one of the many cases to the
effect that an actual delivery of a deed to the grantee is not
what necessary to give validity to the deed. It appeared
Amounts to a that the grantor had the deed prepared and gave
Delivery it to a notary with the instructions to deliver it to
the grantee. Before the notary had made the delivery the
grantor married, subsequent to which he went to the notary
and obtained the deed, saying tlat he would deliver it, which
he did. The Supreme Court of Illinois decided that the
grantor's wife was not entitled to dower, on the ground that
the delivery to the notary for the purpose of delivery to the
grantee was ipso facto delivery to the grantee, in the absence
of any evidence to show that the grantor intended to retain
any control over the deed.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE.
In In Re Tinker, 99 Feb. 79, a novel effort was made to have
adopted the ancient common law conception of the relation
.Nature of between husband and wife. The Bankruptcy Act
Action for (§ 17, St 3) provides that a discharge shall not
Loss of Wife's affectjudgment "for a wilful and malicious injury
Service to the person or property of another." The
creditor, who had obtained a judgment against the bankrupt
for criminal conversation of the creditor's wife, claimed that if
this was not a judgment for an injury to his "person," it was
at least one for an injury to his "property." The District
Court (S. D. N. Y.), however, refused to take this view and
discharged the bankrupt from the judgment.
INSURANCE.
The CiVil Code of Georgia (§ 2114) provides that "An in-
surance on life is a contract by which the insurer, for a stipu-
Insurable lated sum, engages to pay a certain amount of
Interest money if another dies within the time limited by
underOcorgla the policy. The life may be that of the assured
Code or of another in whose continuance the assured
has an interest." In Union Fraternal League v. Walton, 34
S. E. 317, the Supreme Court of Georgia naturally decided
that the above provision only affirms the common law rule
that the doctrine of insurable interest applies only where one
takes out a policy on the life of another, and it does not limit
a person who insures his own life in the choice of the benefi-
ciary. Curiously enough, Lumpkin, J., dissented on the
ground that the term "assured" in the Code was synony-
mous with "beneficiary," so that in all cases the beneficiary
must have an insurable interest in the life of the person who
insures his own life.
MORTGAGES.
"Can a mortgagor, who has planted crops that have become
subject to the lien of a prior mortgage on the land, construc-
SI of tively sever the crop before it matures or ripens,
Crop on by merely executing and delivering a bill of sale
riortgaged: of the uncut crop to a third party, so as to defeat
Land the mortgagee's or the purchaser's right to claim
the crop after he has purchased the land at a foreclosure sale
made before the actual physical severance of the crop ?"
This question is answered in the negative by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in Wootton v. White, 44 Atl. lO26, but
it will be observed that the decision does not cover the case
where the crop is severed and delivered prior to the fore-
closure sale.
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NEGLIGENCE.
Citizens' St. Rwy. v. Hoffbauer, 56 N. E. 54, decides a com-
paratively new point on the subject of electric railways. As
Open Electric is well known, it is customary, on double-track
Car, Duty to electric street railways, where the poles are be-
Furnish Guard
Rail on tween the tracks, to run the cars on the right hand
Dangerous track, and, where the cars are the open ones used
Side in the summer time, with alighting platforms
along the sides, to place a guard rail along the left hand side,
in order to prevent the passengers from alighting in a danger-
ous position. In this case the car, which was running back-
ward, was, unknown to the plaintiff, a passenger, on the left
hand track, so that the unguarded platform was toward the
line of poles, in the middle of the street. The plaintiff stepped
on the platform to obtain a transfer from the conductor, where
he was struck by a pole. The Appellate Court of Indiana
held that the plaintiffwas not guilty of contributory negligence
per se, since he had a right to assume that the unguarded
side of the car was the safe- one.
WILLS.
It is well settled that where a confidential agent of the tes-
tator draws the will, under which he takes a large benefit, the
Undue burden is upon him to prove ab sence of undue
Influence, influence. But this rule does not apply where the
Confidential will in question is made to supersede a former
Agent will, the validity of which is not questioned, and
where the confidential agent would have received the same
benefit under the former will : Walton's Estate, 45 Atl. (Pa.) 426.
McDowell's Estate, 45 Atl. 419, is an instance of the ex-
treme length to which courts have gone in overruling par-
General Plan ticular sentences in wills so as to make them
of will, conform to what is thought to be the " general
Particular scheme" of the will. Here the testator left his
Words property equally among his children, subject to a
life estate in his wife. To the will an undated codicil in these
words was added: "In the final division of my estate I desire
that the grandchildren shall be taken into consideration and that
the estate shall be so divided that the grandchildren shall have
equal shares." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that, as the codicil was, presumptively, of the same date as
the will, it did not sufficiently appear that the testator meant
to disturb the scheme of distribution in the will; the codicil
was therefore held to apply only to those grandchildren whose
parents were dead at the death of the life tenant, that is to
say, the codicil was treated as of no legal effect.
